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John Hogan (DIT), Raj Chari (TCD) and Gary Murphy (DCU) 
 
Abstract: Despite the strengths of the two bodies of literature on Freedom of 
Information (FOI) and Lobbying Regulation, a main inadequacy is that they fail to 
meet each other. The reason why both the FOI and lobbying regulation literatures 
need to be synthesized is that both should be seen as the two sides of the deliberative 
democracy coin: FOI legislation aims to regulate the actions of state officials, while 
lobbying laws seek to regulate the actions of private interests attempting to influence 
such officials. The novelty of this paper is that we thus extend and link the ideas 
raised in these two bodies of literature, by performing a comparative analysis across 
16 jurisdictions in North America, Europe and Asia. Our first main goal is to identify 
a measure for the effectiveness of FOI legislation throughout the world that can be 
compared on a normalized scale. Secondly, we combine these scores with those from 
the extant literature on lobbying regulations, producing what we refer to as an overall 
‘sunshine score.’  This score will represent one of the first encompassing transparency 
measures in the literature, which helps us better conceptualize a unified understanding 
the relationship between FOI and lobbying rules, as well as the openness of 
democratic systems throughout the world. 
 
Introduction and Objectives 
Deliberative democratic theory is based upon the idea that all political acts are public 
acts (Elster, 1998).  Its central principles are that the reasons for political decisions, 
along with the information necessary to assess those reasons, should be in the public 
domain; and the officials who made the decisions should be accountable (Gutmann 
and Thompson, 2004, 135; O’Flynn, 2006, 101).  The theory is thus anchored in 
accountability, which is perceived to supersede consent as the conceptual core of 
democratic legitimacy (Chambers, 2003, 307).  It is invested with the expectation that 
all policies chosen, decisions made and laws implemented, will be justified to the 
electorate (Thompson, 2008, 498).  As such, the concept of transparency, too, guides 
deliberative democratic scholars. As Stasavage (2004, 668) argues, deliberations 
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occurring openly in public ‘increase the quality and the legitimacy of decisions 
taken.’  
To promote transparency and accountability that is espoused by deliberative 
democratic theory, governments throughout the world have pursued two main 
initiatives - freedom of information (FOI) laws and lobbying regulations. These 
initiatives have been highlighted in two related, but heretofore separate, bodies of 
literature.  
In one body, FOI scholars such as Lindberg (2005, 5) have noted that FOI 
legislation emerged from the long history of conflict between secrecy and openness in 
politics. The idea of FOI has been around since the principle of openness - 
Offentlighetsgrundsatsen – was enshrined in Swedish law in 1766 (Banisar, 2006). 
Cogent works by scholars such as Roberts (2001, 244) argue that ‘FOI laws have 
diffused rapidly throughout the advanced democracies over the last thirty years, and 
their organizing principle – the promotion of transparency in policy-making and 
operations – has become entrenched as one of the main precepts of good 
administration.’ There was a particularly dramatic increase in the number of FOI laws 
around the turn of the century (Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006, 98; 
Banisar, 2006). Today’s FOI legislation thus promises that open access to 
governmental information should result in: increased transparency in the policy-
making process (Piotrowski and Rosenbloom, 2002; Fox and Haight, 2011, 354); 
reduced corruption (Banisar, 2006, 6); and greater public participation in policy 
formulation within the area of open and accountable government (Stubbs 2008, 1; 
Hunt and Chapman, 2010, 1; Lidberg 2009, 267.) However, Banisar (2006) 
discovered that many FOI laws promote access in name only.  In some jurisdictions 
the laws lie dormant, while in others they are abused by governments.  Restructuring 
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has also undermined some of these laws by shifting authority to private agencies and 
away from the government departments to which the legislation applied (Roberts, 
2001, 245).  Roberts (2006) argues that the weakening of the influence of FOI laws is 
particularly problematic, as a number of our fundamental human rights are dependent 
upon our ability to access government information. In spite of FOI legislation, states 
will continue to keep secrets and while some level of governmental secrecy is 
probably unavoidable, it is vital to understand the social costs this will entail 
(Ellington, 2011, 85).      
In a second body of literature, scholars have examined the regulation of 
lobbying, where political systems establish rules that lobbyists must comply with 
when attempting to influence public officials. Such regulations are therefore 
concerned with illuminating the action of private interests when influencing public 
actors. Examples of rules include: registering with the state before any contact can be 
made with a public office holder; clearly stating the bill/initiatives that the lobbyists 
seeks to influence; giving individual and employer spending disclosures of amounts 
spent on lobbying; and establishing revolving door provisions where politicians are 
not allowed to enter into the world of lobbying immediately after leaving office. 
Regulations constrain the actions of lobbyists and public officials, even if they do not 
impact upon the power variations between groups (Thomas, 2004, 287).  Advocates 
of regulations believe they help guarantee an adequate level of transparency with 
respect to the activities of lobbyists – enabling the public to exercise their right to 
know who is attempting to influence political decisions (Francis, 1993; Bertók, 2008; 
Obradovic, 2009, Wonka et al., 2010).  Because the information given when 
registering is available for citizens to scrutinize, public officials can also be held 
accountable for their actions (Chari et al., 2007). Some studies on the robustness of 
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lobbying laws suggest that the US has led the way in regulating the activities of 
lobbyists (Zetter, 2009, 16), while others suggest there are various regulatory 
environments found globally, particularly high, medium, and lowly regulated systems 
as seen in the US, Canada and the EU, respectively (Chari et al, 2010, 108-9).  
Despite the strengths of these two related sets of literature, a main inadequacy 
is that they have failed to meet each other. The reason why both the FOI and lobbying 
regulation literatures need to be synthesized is because both should be seen as the two 
sides of the deliberative democracy coin: FOI legislation aims to regulate the actions 
of state officials, while lobbying laws seek to regulate the actions of private interests 
attempting to influence such officials. The novelty of this paper is that we thus extend 
and link ideas raised in these two bodies of literature.  
Despite the fact that a number of studies have examined the development and 
evolution of FOI legislation, none has offered a comparative analysis that classifies 
the laws in terms of their strengths.  Our main goal here is to first, set out the 
effectiveness of FOI legislation across a range of national jurisdictions in North 
America, Europe, Australia and Asia.  The results will be a significant addition to the 
literature, because many studies examining FOI have largely offered single country 
analysis and relied upon qualitative methods to do so (see for example, Heald, 2003; 
Kirtley, 2006). Secondly, we will combine these FOI results with measures on the 
strength of lobbying regulations established in the extant literature and produce what 
we refer to as a ‘sunshine score’: this score will represent the first encompassing 
transparency measures in the literature.  It will help us to better conceptualize a 
unified understanding of the relationship between FOI and lobbying rules, as well as 
the openness of democratic systems throughout the world. 
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 In terms of structure, the next section outlines and justifies the countries 
selected for examination.  Thereafter, we set out a method for scoring the 
effectiveness of FOI legislation.  Based on these scores, and those that measure 
lobbying regulation robustness, ‘sunshine scores’ are calculated.  The subsequent 
section offers reflections on what is referred to as a ‘conceptual map of transparency’ 
before turning to the conclusions.   
 
Jurisdictions Examined: A Worldwide Comparative Approach  
This study adopts a comparative approach to understanding public policy 
developments in relation to transparency and accountability on a global scale, 
analyzing developments in FOI and lobbying regulations in 16 jurisdictions 
worldwide.  The comparative approach allows us discover trends and achieve an 
understanding of broader characteristics (Blondel, 1995).  The jurisdictions selected 
were Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Philippians, 
Poland, Slovenia, Taiwan, the United States, Denmark, Ireland, Spain and the United 
Kingdom.  The first 12 jurisdictions are all of the countries in the world with both 
lobbying regulations and FOI regulations currently in place.  The latter four 
jurisdictions are countries that are on the verge of introducing lobbying regulations 
and have FOI regulations in place.  Thus, this selection consists of a mix of 
jurisdictions with strong, medium, low and no lobbying regulations, but all of which 
have FOI regulations (Chari et al., 2010).  By studying all of the countries in the 
world with both lobbying and FOI regulations, we are able to get a picture of what it 
is like to have encompassing transparency regulations (lobbying and FOI), and we 
can contrast these results with those from the selected jurisdictions that possess only 
FOI regulations at the moment.       
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Table 1: CPI scores for the selected Jurisdictions  
Jurisdiction  
High Regulation  
US 62 
Medium Regulation  
Canada Federal 50 
Hungary 45 
Lithuania 44 
Philippians 39 
Taiwan 38 
Slovenia  35 
Australia  33 
Low Regulation  
Poland 27 
Israel 21 
France  19 
Germany 17 
No Regulation  
Ireland  0 
Denmark 0 
UK 0 
Spain 0 
Source: Chari et al., 2010. 
All of the countries selected here are liberal-market democracies. And all have 
enacted FOI laws, or placed FOI rights in their constitutions over the last 50 years, as 
shown in Table 2 below.  Thus, of these 16 countries, 12 are the only jurisdictions in 
the world that combine lobbying regulations and FOI regulations.   
Table 2 – Introduction of FOI Legislation 
Jurisdiction FOI Regulations and year of first introduction 
US Federal The Freedom of Information Act 1966
1
 
France  Loi n°78-753 du 17 juillet 1978 portant diverses mesures d’amélioration des 
relations entre l’administration et le public et diverses dispositions 
Australia Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act 1982 
Canada Federal Access to Information Act 1982 
Denmark Access to Public Administration Files Act 1985 
Philippians  Philippians Bill of Rights 1987 
Spain Article 105 of Constitución Espanola 1978 and Law on Rules for Public 
Administration 1992 
Lithuania Law on the Provision of Information to the Public 1996
2
 
Ireland  Freedom of Information Act 1997
3
 
Poland Article 61 of the Constitution of 1997 and Law on Access to Public Information 
2001 
Israel  Freedom of Information Law 1998 
United Kingdom  Freedom of Information Act 2000 and the Freedom of Information (Scotland) 
Act 2002 
Hungary Act LXIII on the Protection of Personal Data and Public Access to Data of 
Public Interest 2002 
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Slovenia Access to public Information Act 2003 
Germany Federal Act Governing Access to Information Held by the Federal Government 
2005 
Taiwan Freedom of Government Information Law 2006
4
 
 
As Table 2 shows, some jurisdictions such as the US were amongst the first adopters 
of FOI legislation in the 1960s.  France in the late 1970s, Denmark, Australia and 
Canada in the 1980s, were amongst the second set of adopters.  Lithuania, Ireland, 
Poland, Israel and the UK were in the third wave to implement FOI legislation at the 
turn of the century, with Taiwan in the fourth wave in 2006 (Hazell and Worthy, 
2010).   
The US has a long history of lobbying regulations, at both the state and federal 
levels; the Philippians introduced lobbying regulations in 1957 - modelled on those in 
the US at the time; Canada has had lobbying regulations in place since 1989 at the 
federal level as well as in 7 provinces now; Germany had lobbying regulations at the 
state and federal level; Australia had had lobbying regulations at the federal level 
since 2007 and now in all states as well.  France, Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia and Taiwan all have lobbying rules in force at present.  While four of the 
first five countries mentioned above are federal states and adopted lobbying laws in 
the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries, the latter seven countries adopted lobbying rules only since 
the turn of the century (see Chari et al., Chapters 2 and 3).  Australian has the dubious 
distinction of being one of the few countries to introduce lobbying regulations in the 
early 1980s, only to repeal these in 1996, before reintroducing them in 2007 (Hogan 
et al., 2011).  Denmark, Ireland, Spain the UK do not have lobbying legislation at 
present (although the these government are all either investigating the possibilities of 
introducing such rules, or are actively drafting lobbying legislation). 
Furthermore, in terms of variations between the countries, some jurisdictions 
studied are republics, while others are constitutional monarchies; some are 
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presidential forms of governments, others parliamentary; some are unitary states, 
others federal; and some are national-level jurisdictions while others are 
state/provincial.  Table 3 summarizes FOI legislation and lobbying laws (if 
applicable) in force at the national level in each of the countries examined, as well as 
in the political institutions of the EU. 
 
Table 3: FOI and Lobbying Legislation in the selected countries  
Australia Canada Denmark France 
The federal government 
introduced the Freedom of 
Information Act in 1982.
5
  
Australian was amongst the 
‘second wave’ of countries 
introducing FOI legislation 
(Hazell and Worthy, 2010).  
Victoria introduced a 
similar act in 1982
6
, with 
Queensland
7
 and 
Tasmanian
8
 being the last 
states to introduce FOI 
regulations in 2009.  Bayne 
(1993) sees these laws as a 
break with Anglo-
Australian legal tradition.  
There are lobbying 
regulations in all states and 
the federal level. 
FOI laws have been in 
place in Canada at 
federal, provincial 
and territorial levels 
since the late 1970s.  
Nova Scotia first 
introduced the 
Freedom of 
Information and 
Protection of Privacy 
Act (1977)
9
.  The 
federal government 
introduced the Access 
to Information Act in 
1985.
10
  There are 
lobbying regulations 
at the federal level 
and in seven 
provinces (see Table 
2). 
The Access to Public 
Administration Files 
Act was introduced in 
1985.
11
  Denmark 
does not regulate 
lobbyists.  ‘A salient 
feature of the 
Scandinavian political 
systems has been to 
involve interest 
groups in the policy-
making process 
without having 
formalised 
regulations’ 
(Rechtman, 1998, 
579).   
 
France introduced 
freedom of 
information 
legislation in 1978.
1
  
Article 26(1) of  
the general directives 
of the Bureau of the 
National Assembly  
also states that those 
with special cards 
issued personally by 
the president or by 
the quaestors may 
have access to the 
Salon de la Paix 
(Chari et al., 2010). 
Germany Hungary Ireland Israel 
The federal government 
introduced the Federal Act 
Governing Access to 
Information Held by the 
Federal Government – 
(Informationsfreiheitsgesetz 
- IFG) – in 2005.  Under 
this ‘everyone is entitled to 
official information from 
the authorities.’
12
  Germany 
introduced lobbying 
regulations in 1951, with 
amendment in 1975 and 
1980 (Chari et al., 2010). 
 
The Act LXIII on the 
Protection of Personal 
Data and Public 
Access to Data of 
Public Interest was 
introduced in 1992.  
This guarantees ‘the 
right of everyone to 
exercise control over 
his or her personal 
data and to have 
access to data of 
public interest.’
13
  
Hungary introduced 
lobbying regulations 
in 2006, but repealed 
these in 2011 (Chari 
et al., 2011). 
Ireland introduced the 
Freedom of 
Information Act 
(1997). This 
legislation was 
amended in six years 
later.
14
  There are no 
lobbying regulations 
despite various 
political parties 
promising their 
introduction 
(McGrath, 2009).  
The current 
government is in the 
process of consulting 
the public over such a 
law.       
 
Israel introduced its 
Freedom of 
Information Law, in 
1998.
2
  The law has 
improved 
transparency, but has 
not been an 
overwhelming 
success (Rabin and 
Peled, 2005).  Israel 
introduced lobbying 
regulations in 2008. 
However, Veksler 
(2011) argues that 
these regulations 
have provided only 
symbolic 
transparency for the 
public. 
Lithuania Philippians Poland Slovenia 
                                                 
1
 http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000339241 
2
 http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/Israel--FOIL1998.pdf 
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FOI is guaranteed under 
Article 25 of the 1992 
constitution.
15
 ‘The general 
principle of freedom of 
information’ (Banisar, 
2006, 103) was set out in 
Law on the Provision of 
Information to the Public 
enacted in 1996 and 
amended in 2002.
16
  
Lithuania passed the Law 
on Lobbying Activity 
(LLA) in 2000. 
 
The right to 
information was 
enshrined in the 
constitution in 1987 
(Banisar, 2006, 122).  
Currently a freedom 
of information bill is 
in the Philippians 
parliament.  RA 1827 
is the lobbying act 
passed in the 
Philippians in 1957, 
making it one of the 
first countries in the 
world to regulate this 
activity - however it 
had not been fully 
enforced.
3
     
The right to 
information is 
guaranteed under 
Article 61 of the 1997 
Constitution.
17
  The 
Law on Access to 
Public Information, 
was passed in 2001.  
A citizen must receive 
feedback within two 
weeks.
18
  In 2005, the 
Act on Legislative 
and Regulatory 
Lobbying was 
introduced 
(Galkowski, 2008, 
131). 
 
FOI is guaranteed 
under both the 
Slovenian 
constitution (Banisar, 
2006, 133) and the 
Access to Public 
Information Act 
passed in 2003 and 
amended in 2005.
4
  It 
introduced a lobbying 
law in 2010 - The 
Integrity and 
Prevention of 
Corruption Act.
5
    
Spain Taiwan The United 
Kingdom 
The United States 
Article 105 of the 1978 
constitution guarantees 
access to government 
information.
19
  The Law on 
Rules for Public 
Administration (1992) 
provides for access to 
government records
20
 
(Banisar, 2006, 139).  
Spain does not regulate 
lobbying. 
 
The Freedom of 
Information Law was 
introduced at the very 
end of 2005, coming 
into force in 2006.    
In 2007 Taiwan 
introduced the 
Lobbying Act.  with 
the aim of creating 
"open and transparent 
procedures for 
lobbying".
6
 This 
would permit the 
public and media see 
who is lobbying and 
why.
7
 
 
 
 
 
FOI was introduced in 
the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 
and the Freedom of 
Information 
(Scotland) Act 2002
21
. 
Despite the lobbying 
of policy makers 
being deeply 
ingrained, the UK has 
not introduced 
lobbying regulations 
(Parvin, 2007).  
However, the 
government is 
currently consulting 
on a statutory register 
of lobbyists. 
In 1966 the Freedom 
of Information Act 
was introduced, 
making the US the 
fourth country to 
have FOI legislation 
(Vleugels, 2009).  
This has been 
amended three times 
to take account of 
electronic media.  All 
states and territories 
have FOI legislation.  
The federal 
government has been 
regulating lobbyists 
since 1946, while all 
50 states have 
lobbying laws today. 
 
Determining an ‘FOI Score’ 
In order to attain a better understanding of the strength of the transparency initiatives 
in each of the jurisdictions studied, this section will outline the quantitative indices 
used to measure the strength of lobbying laws and FOI legislation. 
                                                 
3
 http://www.thelobbyist.biz/policy-matters/1153-lobby-reform 
4
 https://www.ip-rs.si/index.php?id=324 
5
 http://www.regulatelobbying.com/images/Slovenia_Lobbying_Law-3.pdf 
6
 http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/news/news_detail.aspx?id=3281 
7
 http://www.cepd.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0010668&key=&ex=%20&ic=&cd= 
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 When turning to measuring the strength of lobbying laws, while authors such 
as Opheim (1991) and Brinig et al. (1993) attempted to measure the strength of 
lobbying rules in the US, more recent literature has established that perhaps the most 
robust measures to comparatively analyze the strength of lobbying rules worldwide is 
using the Center of Public Integrity’s (CPI) Index (see, Chari et al, 2007 & 2010; 
Hogan et al., 2011).  CPI’s analysis, whose objective is to better understand the 
transparency and accountability promoted by lobbying laws, is referred to as the 
‘Hired Guns’ method, resulting in ‘CPI Scores.’  
 
The CPI writes that 
 
‘Hired Guns’ is an analysis of lobby disclosure laws... The Center 
for Public Integrity created a ranking system that assigns a score to 
each state (with lobbying legislation) based on a survey containing a 
series of questions regarding state lobby disclosure. The questions 
addressed eight key areas of disclosure for state lobbyists and the 
organizations that put them to work:  
 
• Definition of Lobbyist  
• Individual Registration  
• Individual Spending Disclosure  
• Employer Spending Disclosure  
• Electronic Filing  
• Public Access (to a registry of lobbyists) 
• Enforcement  
• Revolving Door Provisions (with a particular focus on 
‘cooling off periods’)
22
 
 
Each lobbying law is analyzed by way of textual analysis with a total of 48 questions 
for the above eight sections outlined by the CPI. Each question is thus assigned a 
point value according to the answer.
23
 The scale of final scorings ranks between 1 
(weak lobbying legislation) to 100 (most robust lobbying rules that promote full 
transparency). Chari et. al (2010) have argued that systems that have a point scoring 
between 1 and 29 can be considered ‘lowly regulated systems’; between 30 and 59 
can be considered ‘medium regulation’; and over 60 can be considered ‘high 
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regulation.’ Chari et al. (2010) and Hogan et. al (2011) have calculated the CPI scores 
for most of the jurisdictions studied in the paper, save Alberta and Manitoba.    
 When turning to measuring the strength of FOI laws we can see that some 
excellent work has been done in this area in recent years.  For example Vleugels 
(2009) provides a ranking system for national FOI regulations based on the number of 
annual FOI requests per 100,000 citizens.  But, this does not take account of 
responses to those requests – something Lidberg (2009) regards as a crucial indicator 
of the legislation’s operational effectiveness and the government’s commitment to 
FOI.  Hazell and Worthy (2010) consider various measures to test the performance of 
an FOI act, two of which are the number of FOI requests and the number of requests 
granted. They argue that the higher the numbers of requests and responses, the 
healthier the FOI regime (Hazell and Worthy, 2010).  However, these approaches are 
very different from those employed by the CPI in studying lobbying regulations.  
Where the CPI’s index is a de jure measure of lobbying regulations, these approaches 
to measuring FOI are outcome measures only.  Combining the results of these 
outcome measures of FOI with the CPI’s lobbying measures would be like adding 
apples and oranges.  In this context, employing Centre for Law and Democracy’s 
(CLD) measure of FOI, set out in their Right to Information (RTI) rating 
methodology, would be an ideal means of examining the comparative openness of 
societies around the world.  The CLD’s RTI measure of the strength of FOI 
legislation is, as a de jure measure of FOI regulations, very similarly to the CPI’s 
measure for lobbying regulations - due to the RTI’s use of 61 questions set within 
seven categories of disclosure, with a maximum possible score of 150 points.
8
  The 
CLD writes: 
                                                 
8
 http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/COVER-NOTE.pdf 
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The indicators ‘are drawn from a wide range of international standards 
on the right to information, as well as comparative study of numerous 
right to information laws from around the world.  The indicators are 
grouped into seven main categories, as follows: 
 
• Right of Access  
• Scope  
• Requesting Procedures  
• Exceptions and Refusals  
• Appeals  
• Sanctions and Protections  
• Promotional Measures9 
 
Thus, as with the CPI methodology, each FOI law has been analyzed by the 
CLD through means of textual analysis and then assigned a number value based on 
the 61 question asked.  The scoring will come in between a minimum of 1 and a 
maximum of 150.  This methodology, as with the CPI’s contains a clear set of scoring 
rules as to how points are attributed – so as to ensure consistency across different 
countries.   “The assessments were based primarily on the main right to information 
law, as well as the constitution and, as appropriate, subordinate and supporting 
legislation.”
10
  That the CLD also used local experts to review their analysis of FOI in 
each of the jurisdictions, as well as accounting for the fact that some of the countries 
are unitary states and others are federal, makes the CLD’s approach a robust means of 
analyzing FOI legislation worldwide. 
We provide the CLD’s RTI scores for FOI legislation in each of the 
jurisdictions in Table 4.  These are set out in descending order.  We also normalise 
these scores around 100 in order to make them similar to the CPI’s scores for 
lobbying regulations.   
Table 4: CLD’s RTI scores for FOI  
Jurisdiction RTI score for FOI RTI score normalised too 
100 
                                                 
9
 http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/COVER-NOTE.pdf 
10
 http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/COVER-NOTE.pdf 
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Slovenia  130 86.6 
UK 97 64.7 
US 89 59.3 
Hungary 87 58 
Ireland  86 57.33 
Australia  84 56 
Canada Federal 79 52.6 
France  70 46.7 
Israel 68 45.32 
Denmark 66 44 
Lithuania 61 40.7 
Poland 61 40.7 
Taiwan 60 40 
Germany 54 36 
Philippians N/A 0 
Spain N/A 0 
Source: http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Chart-w-
hyperlinks.pdf 
 
Table 4 shows that the highest ranked jurisdiction in terms of the CLD’s RTI scoring 
system is Slovenia at 130, normalised to 86.6.  There is a significant gap back to the 
next jurisdiction which is the UK, followed by the US.  The US, Hungary, Ireland and  
Australia are all located within 5 points of each other.  Canada and France are the 
only jurisdictions in the 70s.  Bunched fairly close together, all within 8 points of each 
other are the five jurisdictions located between 68 and 60, with Germany at 54 
coming in last.   The CLD’s RTI has no scores for the last two countries that we are 
examining – the Philippians and Spain.  Of the 16 countries being examined, 5 (the 
UK, US, Australia, Canada and Ireland) are “Anglo-Saxon” and occupy 5 of the 7 top 
places in terms of FOI.  Three of these countries are also federal states.   
 
‘Sunshine Scores’ 
Having measures of lobbying regulation robustness (on a 100 point scale) and those 
for FOI strength, also on a 100 point scale, the objective is to sum both of these 
measures in order to arrive at what is referred to as a ‘Sunshine Score’.  This sunshine 
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score will therefore have a maximum value of 200, where the closer it is to the 
maximum, the more transparency and accountability is promoted within the 
jurisdiction.  While the absolute value (between 0 and 200) is of importance, what is 
also of interest is how the jurisdictions rank against each other in terms of overall 
sunshine, and if there are any discernible trends regarding how the jurisdictions score 
in terms of both lobbying regulation and FOI measures. Table 4 summarizes the main 
findings. 
Table 4: Transparency Measures – CPI Scores, FOI Scores and overall Sunshine 
Scores 
Jurisdiction CPI Score RTI Score 
(normalised 
to 100) 
Sunshine 
Score  
(out of 200) 
High Lobbying Regulations    
US 62 59.3 121.3 
    
Medium Lobbying Regulations    
Canada Federal 50 52.6 102.6 
Hungary 45 58 103 
Lithuania 44 40.7 84.7 
Philippians 39 0 39 
Taiwan 38 40 78 
Slovenia  35 86.6 121.6 
Australia  33 56 89 
    
Low Lobbying Regulations    
Poland 27 40.66 67.7 
Israel 21 45.32 66.3 
France  19 46.7 65.7 
Germany 17 36 53 
    
No Lobbying Regulations    
Ireland  0 57.33 57.33 
Denmark 0 44 44 
UK 0 64.7 64.7 
Spain 0 0 0 
Source: Chari et al., 2010; http://www.law-democracy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/Chart-w-hyperlinks.pdf 
 
When considering the overall sunshine scores of all jurisdictions, we see that the 
highest is Slovenia at 121.6.  It is only 0.3 ahead of the US in terms of overall 
 15
transparency.  That US federal transparency and accountability legislation is ranked 
relatively high in this instance can be explained by the fact that lobbying rules at the 
federal level are, since 2007, more robust than those found in any other country, as 
well as in many of the US states, giving the federal government a higher CPI score, 
thereby offsetting its relatively low RTI score in comparison with Slovenia.  In fact, 
the gap between Slovenia and the US in lobbying legislation is reverend in terms of 
the strength of their FOI legislation.  Hungary has the third highest Sunshine Score at 
103, just slightly ahead of Canada. The fifth highest sunshine shore belongs to 
Lithuania at 84.7, making it the third former Eastern Bloc country in the top five.  
What we also see amongst these top five countries is how, apart from Slovenia, their 
CPI and FOI scores appear to match each other. 
 In the case of Australia, for instance, we see that its higher RTI score, as 
opposed to CPI score, indicates a greater emphasis on the regulation of the actions of 
state officials as opposed to private interests.  This is something that has been noted in 
relation to Australia's lobbying codes of conduct since the 1980s.  There is a tradition 
to regulating state officials in Australia, going back as far as the 1979, when the 
Committee of Inquiry Concerning Public Duty and Private Interest produced a report 
that formed the backbone of the Australian Public Service code of conduct.
24
  That 
report’s focus on public servants also set the tone for Australia’s approach to 
regulating lobbying, placing the onus for monitoring and enforcing lobbying 
regulations on public servants, not the lobbyists (Hogan et al., 2011).  Thus, the onus 
for ensuring transparency, through codes of conduct for lobbyists, essentially falls on 
the government representatives. 
 For the countries with low and no lobbying regulations the gap between their 
CIP and RTI scores widens as the CIP score decreases.  Spain is the only country that 
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we selected to examine that has neither a CPI score (as there is no lobbying 
regulation) or a RTI score (as it could not be determined by the CLD).  Although 
Spain has FOI legislation, the CLD was not able to calculate and RTI for it. 
Table 5: Top 10 sunshine scores 
Jurisdiction Sunshine Score  
Slovenia 121.6 
US 121.3 
Hungary 103 
Canada 102.6 
Australia 89 
Lithuania 84.7 
Taiwan 78 
Poland 67.7 
Israel 66.3 
France  65.7 
 
While the European jurisdictions tend to have a lower CPI score, they make up for 
this with higher RTI scores.  As a result, two of the top three countries in terms of 
their overall sunshine scores are Slovenia and Hungary.  Of the highest scoring 
European countries, four of the top five are former Easter Bloc countries (Lithuania 
was an actual republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)).  France 
was the highest scoring Western European country.  The sunshine scores of the 
Germany, Denmark, Ireland and Spain represent the lowest scoring jurisdictions 
examined in this study.  Particularly, in the case of these latter countries (apart from 
Germany), the fact that they have not implemented any form of lobbying regulations 
means they do not have a CPI score and this impacts significantly upon their low 
overall sunshine scores.       
 Thus, we can see that the Sunshine score presents a more rounded measure, 
and as such deepens out understanding, of transparency and accountability within any 
given jurisdiction.  Weak FOI regulations can be offset by strong lobbying regulations 
or vice versa, ensuring an open and accountable government and society. 
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 When attempting to decipher if there are any trends between lobbying 
regulation and FOI scores, one sees that states with medium and low lobbying 
regulation possess a wide range of FOI scores, so it is difficult to conclude that there 
is a discernible trend.  However, there is some evidence that relatively robust 
lobbying rules do go hand in hand with high FOI scores.  This is the case for the US 
(which had the highest CPI score and the 2
nd
 highest RTI score of the sample), 
Canada (2
nd
 highest CPI, 7
th
 highest RTI), and Hungary (3
rd
 CPI, 3
rd
 RTI).  We have 
also seen that in some instances weak CPI scores are offset by strong RTI scores, and 
weak RTI scores are offset by strong CPI scores.  It is difficult to ascertain that a 
general rule can be derived from these findings, as relatively high-ranking CPI 
jurisdictions (such as Lithuania and the Philippians) either have low RTI scores or do 
not produce data that would enable the CLD to calculate RTI scores.  However, there 
is some evidence that having relatively weak RTI scores does correspond with having 
no lobbying regulations whatsoever – as in the cases of Spain and Denmark.   
 Of course, once Ireland, the UK, Spain and Denmark have introduced 
lobbying regulations their sunshine scores should change significantly – indicative of 
greater transparency in their societies.  This was the situation in Australia after 2007 
with the reintroduction of lobbying regulations which saw its CPI score rise from 0 to 
33 and in the US in the same year due to its reform of the lobbying law at the federal 
level where the CIP score jumped from 36 to 62 (Charil et al., 2010).   
 
Conceptual Map of Transparency 
As with lobbying and lobbying regulation, there is no clear definition of what 
governmental transparency is (Florini, 2007).  However, as we now possess CPI and 
RTI scores for each of the jurisdictions examined, we can position the location of 
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each on a conceptual transparency map.  The idea for this kind of a map is borrowed 
from Lijphart’s (1999) concept of a conceptual map of democracies.  The x–axis – 
regulated transparency – represents the rigour of lobbying regulations.  The y-axis – 
informational transparency – represents the effectiveness of FOI legislation.  The 
units on each axis constitute standard deviations, in order to show how much variation 
there is from the average, in terms of the rigour and effectiveness of regulated and 
informational transparency (respectively) in each jurisdiction.  High values indicate 
stronger lobbying regulations and more effective FOI legislation.  For each 
jurisdiction their position on the map is indicative of their Sunshine Score and the 
strength of that score in relation to every other jurisdiction plotted and also in relation 
to the FOI and CPI means for all 16 national jurisdictions examined. 
 
Figure 1: Two dimensional conceptual map of transparency 
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Out on the right of the map is the US, with its strong lobbying regulations and high 
FOI rules, followed by Canada, Hungary and Lithuania, though Lithuania’s FOI is 
relatively low.  Far to the left are places like the UK, Ireland, Denmark and Spain 
without any lobbying rules in place.  Near to the top of the map is Slovenia with its 
very high RTI score and relatively high CPI score, while in addition to Spain, the 
Philippians lies as the bottom of the map due to its having not RTI score. 
 On the lobbying regulation dimension, all jurisdictions are within 2 standard 
deviations of the mean.  Apart from the US, all other jurisdictions are in fact within 
1.5 standard deviations to the right or left of the mean.  On the FOI regulations 
dimension Slovenia is almost two standard deviations above the mean, while Spain 
and the Philippians are just over two standard deviations below the mean.  In many 
respects, Slovenia is a true outlier, located more than twice as far above the mean as 
any other jurisdiction, the nearest county to it on the FOI axis being the UK.     
We can see how jurisdictions in the top right hand quadrant of the 
transparency map, the US, Canada, Hungary, Slovenia and Australia seem to have 
achieved a balance between lobbying regulation and FOI legislations.  Most of these 
jurisdictions are located above the trend line – being amongst the most transparent 
jurisdictions that we examined.  Taiwan, Lithuania and the Philippians are located in 
the lower right hand quadrant, below the trend line.  These states have medium 
lobbying regulations, but their RTI scores were relatively low, and 0 in the case of the 
Philippians.  Poland is on the border of this quadrant.  Germany, Denmark and Spain 
are in the lower left hand quadrant.  These countries have both low lobbying 
regulations and FOI regulations also.  Israel is right on the border of this quadrant, 
with its FOI exactly on the mean, while its CPI is slightly below the mean.  France, 
the UK and Ireland are located in the top left hand quadrant.  Their FOI scores are 
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well above the mean, but whereas France’s CPI is relatively low, both Ireland and the 
UK score 0 on CPI – as neither had lobbying regulations in place.  Ireland and the UK 
were the only jurisdictions without lobbying regulations to be located above the FOI 
mean, while Denmark, another country without lobbying regulations, comes very 
close to that mean.   Spain, located in the bottom left hand corner of the map, is 
representative of jurisdictions without lobbying regulation and which, although they 
have FOI legislation, the CLD has been unable to provide an RTI score for.   
From Figure 1 there is a slight upward trend in RTI scores, as CPI scores 
increase from left to right.  States with high lobbying regulations tend to have slightly 
more effective FOI legislation.  This suggests that stronger regulation of the actions of 
state officials leads to stronger regulation of those private interests attempting to 
influence those same state officials – namely lobbyists.  This finding is supported by 
the fact that 4 of the 7 countries located to the right of the mean for lobbying 
regulations are also above the mean of the informational transparency dimension, 
with Taiwan and Lithuania very close to that mean.  The only real outlier in the two 
right hand quadrant was the Philippians, which has no RTI score at all.  Of the 4 
jurisdictions without lobbying regulations examined here, the UK and Ireland had 
FOI scores above the mean.  In the cases of Denmark and Spain their RTI scores 
came in below the FOI mean.  This suggests that stronger lobbying regulations and 
stronger FOI regulations tends to go together – as is borne out by the ascending trend 
line.  Developing rules for transparency in relation to private interests leads to rules 
for transparency in relation to state officials and vice versa.   
The governments in both Ireland and the UK, countries that introduced FOI 
regulations around the turn of the century, are currently considering the introduction 
of lobbying regulations.  This suggests that once a jurisdiction introduces either FOI 
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rules or lobbying regulations, an acceptance of the broader concept of transparency 
occurs that gradually leads to both sets of regulations coming into force.  We have 
seen this with the rapidly increasing number of jurisdictions that have introduced 
lobbying regulations since the turn of the century, as well as the gradual strengthening 
of extant regulations at the federal, state and provincial levels in the US, Canada and 
Australia (Chari et al., 2010).  In this respect, we have found that time tends to also be 
an important factor, as the longer either lobbying regulations or FOI legislation is in 
place, the more likely it is to undergo revisions, and in most cases these revisions 
tend, overall, to produce stronger transparency legislation and regulations. 
The conceptual map in Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of relative 
transparency in each jurisdiction, and as such constitutes a transparency snapshot.  In 
a couple of years, the relative positions of the jurisdictions will have all changed as 
they introduce/reform their lobbying regulations, or alter the workings of their FOI 
legislation.  As such, this map will serve as a historic artefact, enabling us to track the 
shifting transparency of each country, state and province mapped here. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the existence of a wide-ranging literature on FOI legislation and lobbying 
regulations, no study has sought to integrate both forms of transparency regulations 
into a comprehensive transparency measure – what we call a sunshine score.  Nor, has 
a comparative study on this scale, involving 16 national jurisdictions, sought to 
understand, compare and contrast FOI and lobbying regulations in order to discover 
trends in relation to transparency and accountability.     
 The article initially provides details as to how FOI legislation and lobbying 
regulations constitute two sides of the transparency debate.  Both sets of regulations 
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seek to shine a light into the black box of policy making from different directions, 
with FOI legislation focusing on the actions of state officials, while lobbying 
regulations concentrate on the actions of those trying to influence state officials.  The 
article then discussed case selection criteria and provided a brief overview on the 
development FOI legislation in each jurisdiction.  This encompassed the different 
waves in the introduction of FOI legislation, starting with the first wave in the US in 
the mid 1960s and ending with Taiwan in 2006. 
 The article’s first objective was to offer a means of measuring the 
effectiveness of FOI legislation in each jurisdiction – their “FOI scores”.  This was 
achieved using the CLD’s RTI scores for FOI legislations.  The CLD has examined 
FOI regulation in 90 countries in total, but we were primarily interest in those 
countries that also had lobbying regulations in place or were close to the introducing 
such regulations.   
The article’s second object was to develop an overarching transparency 
measure, what we refer to here as a sunshine score.  The RTI scores set out here were 
combined with Chari et al’s (2010) use of CPI scores for the rigour of lobbying 
regulations, to provide the sunshine score of the overall level of transparency in each 
country studied.   
These sunshine scores then permitted the development of a two dimensional 
conceptual map of regulated and informational transparency in each jurisdiction.  
From this we can see how having more effective FOI legislation, or more rigorous 
lobbying regulations, impacts upon the positing of each jurisdiction.  But also how, 
over time, these jurisdictions might move in relation to one another, as their FOI 
legislation becomes more effective or they reform their lobbying regulations. 
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 Thus, this study has been concerned with presenting the level of transparency 
in 16 jurisdictions by looking at both their FOI and lobbying regulations.  By 
combining the RTI scores for FOI legislation with CPI scores for lobbying 
regulations, the study has produced what we refer to as sunshine scores.  These 
provide an insight into the overall levels of transparency in each jurisdiction.  As 
political acts are public acts, deliberative democratic theory suggests democracy can 
be enhanced through publicity and accountability.  It is certainly the case that in 
combination, FOI laws and lobbying regulations have the potential to offer 
democratic societies the opportunity of moving beyond representative democracy to 
deliberative democracy, where the decisions of the agent (politicians) and the actions 
of those trying to influence them (lobbyists) are visible to the principle (the general 
public).  Thus, through the greater transparency offered by effective FOI legislations 
and strong lobbying regulations the dangers of moral hazard are negated – 
representatives pursuing private interests over those of the public – as their 
behaviours are observable.   
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